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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1757 
OITY OF! FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA, 
versus 
SANITARY GROCERY COMPANY, INC. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Sup-reme CoJ,trt of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, the City of Fredericksburg, respectfully 
shows unto the Court, that it is aggrieved by final order 
of the Corporation Court of Fredericksburg, Va., entered 
on the -9th day of November, 1935, in a certain proceeding 
therein pending, to correct an alleged erroneous assessment 
of license taxes, wherein the Sanitary Grocery Company, Inc., 
was plaintiff and the City of Fredericksburg, defendant. 
The former will hereafter be referred to as plaintiff and 
the latter as defendant. A transcript of the record of said 
proceeding, duly certified by the Clerk of the lower court, 
is filed herewith. · 
This case involves the power of the City to classify and 
tax chain stores as ·such, and is one of first impression in 
Vkghrla. ' 
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ASSIGNM:E.NT OF ERROR. 
Petitioner assigns as error: 
(1) The action of the court in overruling its motion to 
quash the application filed by the Sanitary Grocery Com-
pany, Inc., for correction of erroneous assessment. 
(2) The action of the court in directing the City of Fred-
ericksburg to pav and refund unto the Sanitary Grocery 
Company, Inc., the sum of $1,000.00, assessed against it and 
collected under City ordinance for the years 1933 and 1934. 
FACTS OF THE CASE. 
The Council of the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia, on, 
to-wit, December 13, 1932, adopted a license tax ordinance 
for the year 1933 containing, among other things, S'ection 
10, as follows : 
''On e~ery person, firm or corporation, opening, operating 
or maintaining two or more stores or mercantile establish-
ments in this City under the same general m~gement, super-
vision or ownership, the following license fees : On two stores 
or more, $250.00 for each store in excess of one. 
''The license fee herein prescribed shall be paid annually 
and shall be in addition to the· license prescribed by Section 
8, and by any .other section of this ordinance.'' 
Section 8, of the same ordinance, levies a graduated tax 
on "every merchant or me.rcantile firm", h~sed on purchases. 
This ordinance was approv:ed by the Mayor on Decem-
ber 16, 1932. The same ordinance was in effect for the year 
19:34. During the years· 1933 and 1934 the Sanitary Grocery 
Company, Inc., a chain store organization, operated ·three 
stores in the City. It was accordingly assessed for eaeh 
of said years with a lieense tax of $500.00, which taxes were 
paid under protest. 
After doing this, the Company applied to the United States 
Di~trict Court at Richmond for relief, and the case was there 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It then filed its application 
for correction of erroneous assessment, under Section 414, 
of the Virginia Tax Code, in the Corporation Court of Fred-
ericksburg, :Va. The City thereupon moved the Court to 
quash the application on the following grounds: 
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(1) That the City ordinance, Section 10, complained of, 
is a valid and legal exercise of the po,ver of taxation by the 
Oil~ · 
(2) That the City charter, Acts 1932, page 816, authorizes 
and empowers the Council of the City of Fredericksburg to 
levy the tax complained of. 
(3)· The power to impose a tax on chain store concerns as 
a class has been upheld by the Supren1e Court of the United 
States. 
Indiana v. Jackson, 283 lJ. S. 527, 75 La,v Ed. 284; 73 
A. L. R. 1464 . 
.A. & P. Co. v. North Carolina, 284 U. S. 575. 
Fox; Tax Com'missioner of West Virginia, v. Standard Oil 
Co. of New Jersey. 
( 4) The classification made by the City ordinance is reason-
able and not arbitrary, considering the difference between 
an ordinary merchant and a chain store merchant. 
(5) The ordinance con1plained of, neither violated the Con-
stitution of the United States nor the State of Virginia, and 
violates no statute la,v of the latter. · 
( 6) The ordinance is not unreasonable, nor is it confisca-
tory, arbitrary, discriminatory and unequal, but, on the con-
trary, is reasonable both as to classification and the tax im-
posed. 
No testimony was offered by either side and subsequently 
an order was entered, overruling the motion to quash, to 
which action of the Court, the City excepted, as shown by 
said order, and the City 'vas directed to refund the sum of 
$1,000.00 for the two tax years. 
There was no opinion by the lower court, either verbal 
or written, and it is, therefore, impossible to say upon what 
particular ground or grounds, relief was granted. 
ARGUlVIENT. 
The charter of the City of Fredericksburg, as it existed 
in both 1938 and 1934, may be found in Acts of 1932, p~gc 
816. This charter is unusually broad. It contains pertinent 
sections as follows : ! 
Section 22, of Chapter 3, after providing that, "the coln-
cil shall have all the general po·wers vested in it by the Con-
stitution and laws of the State, provides that it shall further 
have .power: 
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"(a} To levy, assess and collect taxes and to horrow money 
'vithin the limits provided by .the Constitution of Virginia 
and by the Statute laws of the Commonwealth.'' 
Section 32, Chapter 7, of the charter, reads as follows: 
"In the execution of its powers and duties, the City Coun-
cil may levy and collect taxes, annually, by assessment in 
said City on all subjects, the taxation of which by cities is 
not forbidden by general law, to such extent as they shall 
deem nec.essary to defray the expenses of the same, and in 
such manner as they shall deem expedient (in accordance with 
the laws of this State and the United States)." 
The Court's attention is directed to the broad language of 
Section 33, Chapter 7, as follows : 
''The City Council may levy a tax or license on any per-
son, firm or corporation conducting any business or profes-
sion whatsoever in this City, except when prohibited by gen-
eral law, whether a license may be required therefor by the 
State or not, and may exceed the State license, if a.ny be re-
quired.'' 
CASES. 
Whatever doubt may have existed as to the power of a 
State to impose taxes on chain store ·concerns, as a class, 
has been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the following cases : 
Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527,75 Law Ed. 248,73 A. L. R. 
1464. 
A.~ P. Co. v. Norlh Carolina, 284 U.S. 575. 'lo~ 
Fox, Tax Oom;missioner of W. Va., v. Standard Oil Con!; 7 • 
pany of N. J., U. S. Supreme Court, Law edit. Advance 7 
Opinions, Vol. 79, #6, page 339, decided January 14, 1935. 
Examination of the decision in· the Jackson case, supra, 
will show that the City ordinance complained of (Section 10), 
follows the language of the Indiana Statute, sustained in the 
J~ckson case, though the rate of taxation imposed is, of 
course, different. 
This case disposes of the plaintiff's contention that the City 
ordinance violates the 14th Amendment of the Constitution. 
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Its further con~ntion that it violates Section 10, of Article 
1, of the same Constitution and Section 58 of Article 3 
(which ought to read Article 4), of the Constitution of Vir-
ginia, in that it impairs the obligation of l-eases entered into 
between plaintiff and certain property owners, on the prob-
ability that the plaintiff may have to vacate certain stores 
because the tax is heavy, is not worthy of consideration and 
will be passed over ·without further comment. 
The same criticism applies to its further contention that 
it violates paragraph 12, of Section 63, Article 3 (which 
ought to read Article 4), of the Constitution of Virginia. 
This paragraph prohibits the General Assembly from enact-
ing any local, special or privat·e laws, "regulating trade". 
The City ordinance does not attempt to regulate trade but 
merely taxes a certain business. 
Its further contention that it violates Section 168 of Article 
13, of the Constitution of Virginia, "in that the tax is not 
uniform behveen the same class of subjects within the City, 
is disposed of by the Jackson case, supra, and by the follow-
ing Virginia cases : 
Bradley v. Rich1nond, 110 Va. 521 . 
. Pocahontas Co. v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 108. 
Cornmonwealth v. Bibee Co., 153 Va. 935. 
See also: 
19 R. C. L., Section 255. 
McQuillin on Municipal Corp., Vol. 13, Sect. 1101. 
The above cases establish the proposition, ''that the pro-
vision of Section 168 of the Constitution, requiring equality 
and uniformity of taxation, applies only to a direct tax on 
property and not to license taxes, which do not alwavs rest 
upon a basis of uniformity. ., 
The true _rule is that classification (which is here involved), 
"must rest upon son1e reasonable ground of difference, 'vhich 
has some relation to· business or occupation. The ta.x must 
bear equally and ~niformly upon all persons engaged on the 
same class of business ' '. 
Under Section of the City ordinance, an entirely new classi-
fication has been created, this classification having been held 
valid by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases 
cited, .c;u,pra, and in the imposition of the tax, the rule abov~ 
cited has been followed to the letter. 
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THE REAL ISSUES. 
Most of the above discussion is devoted to issues not pre-
sented in argument by plaintiff's counsel, but touched on 
here because of allegations contained in its application. It 
~ay be safely asserted that there are only two real issues 
iu this case, to-wit: 
(1). Does Section 10 of the License Tax Ordinance constitute 
a diyision of plaintiff's business· into its constituent elements, 
with the levy of a separate tax on each element or incident 
thereof. 
(2) Is the City prohibited from classifying chain stores as 
such, because the Commonwealth has not adopted a. similar 
· classification. 
These two questions will be discussed in their order. 
It is admitted that the City cannot subdivide an existing 
State classification so as to levy a ,separate tax on each sub-
division. It was so held in Norfolk v. Griffin, 120 Va. 524, 
and see also McQuillen on Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3, 
Section 1103. Nor does the City attempt' to do this. On 
the contrary, Section 10 creates an entirely new classifica-
tion, which is not the division of an existing one, but is dis-
tinct and separate. 
In other words, the City has not attempted to subdivide mer-
chants' licenses, but has created an entirely new classifi-
cation, to-wit, "chain store merchants". 
Prior to the decision of'the Supreme Court of the United 
States in India;na v. Jackson, supra, it had been contended 
that such a classification could not be set up. However, in 
that case and in the later cases cited, that Court recognized 
the classification in question and held it reasonable, con-
sidering the difference between an ordinary merchant and a 
chain store merchant. 
In Indiana v. Jackson, supra, the Court said: 
''It is not the function of this court in cases like the present 
to consider the propriety or justness of t:Qe tax, to seek for 
the motives or to criticize the public policy 'vhich prompted 
the adoption of the legislation. Our duty is to sustain the 
classification adopted by the legislature, if there are sub-
stantial differences between the occupations separately classi-
fied. Such difference need not be great. The past decisions 
of the court make this abundantly clear." 
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Among other cases cited in support of the above statement 
is that of Armou'r ~ Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. (1), 62 La-w 
Edit. 547. In its reference to tlus case the Supreme Court 
quotes from the opinion of this Court in .. Armour & Co. v. 
Virginia as- follows: 
"In the first place, we are of the oph1ion that the distinction 
upon which the classification in the statute rests behveen a 
manufacturer selling- goods by him n1ade at their place of 
manufacture and one engaged as a nwrchant in whole or in 
part in selling good$ of his manufacture at a place of business 
other than where they were made is so obvious as to require 
nothing but a mere statement of the two classes. All ques-
tions concerning the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment may, therefore, be put out of view." 
The Supreme Court also cited the case of Bradley v. Rich-
mond, 227 U. S. 477, 47 Law· Edit. 603. This case went to 
that court on appeal fr01n the Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals, and the opinion of the latter court will be found in 
110. Va. 521. This case is strikingly similar to the instant 
one. 
Pollard's Code of 1904, Section 78, of the Tax Bill, sho,vs 
that at that time, the State imposed a license tax on private 
banks, under a single classification. The City of Richmond, 
however, placed certain private bankers in one class and cer-. 
tain others in another class, the license tax on the latter being 
less than the license tax on the former. Both our court and 
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld these classi-
fications because of the different methods pursued by banks 
in the two classifications. 
In the first class 'vere placed bankers lending money a.t a 
high rate upon salaries and household furniture, and in the 
second, bankers lending money on commercial securities. In 
upholding these classifications the Supreme Court of the 
United States said that, ''obviously the burden was upon the 
plaintiff in error to show an illegal and capricious classifi-
cation''. 
The City of Fredericksburg has set up a new classification 
for chain stores, held reasonable- by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the cases cited above, just as the City 
of Richmond set up a. ne'\v classification for certain privat€ 
bankers. If the classification set up by Fredericksburg is 
unreasonal>le or capricious, the burden rested squarely upon 
the plaintiff to establish this, and it has failed to do so. As 
a matter of fact, it introduced no evidence whatevet', perhaps 
for tl1e good reason that the Supreme Court of the United 
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States has recognized the 'difference behveen an ordinary 
merchant and a chain store merchant for purposes of classi-
fication and taxation. 
In Bradley v. Richmond, 110 Va. 521, at page 526, the Court 
said: 
"It was competent for the council to assign private bankers 
to different classes, and the plaintiff in, error was required 
to pay no greater license tax· than all others in the same 
class with him. In order tp render the classification illegal, 
the party assailing it must show that the business discrimi-
n~ted against is precisely the same as that included in the 
class which is alleged to be favored. Norfolk <t Co. v. Nor-
folk, 105 Va. 139, 52 S. E. 851. This has not been shown in 
the present case. On the contrary, it appears that the busi-
ness of the plaintiff in error is not precisely the same with 
that of other private bankers who are put in a different 
.class and assessed with a less license tax.'' 
The difference between the Bradley case and Norfolk v. 
Griffin, supra, is plain. In the former a new classification 
was created, while in the latter the City attempted, "to divide 
and make of one subject of taxation, as classified and defined 
by law for State taxation, a number of subjects for the pur-
pose of City taxation''. This it sought to divide the busi-
ness of a general contractor into its constituent elements 
and incidents and to levy a separate tax on each, as follows : 
(1) Brickmasons, (2) Plaster contractors, (3) Roof and 
Sheet Metal workers, ( 4) Cement and concrete workers, (5) 
Painters and 'vall decorators, (6) Stonemasons, (7) Any 
other branch of the building trade not· mentioned or pro-
vided for. 
The City ordinance required a special license for each 
of these various occupations. 
Clearly, the instant case falls within the ruling of this Court 
in Bradley v. Richmond, supra, and is not affected bv that in 
Norfolk v. Griffin, supra. · 
The question of clas-sification from the State's standpoint 
is dealt with in the reoont case of Commonwealth v. Bibee Oo., 
153 Va. 935. This case involved the constitutionality of the 
last paragraph of Section 188 of the Tax Code. -Section 188, 
after providing generally for a license tax on retail mer-
chants, based upon purchases, further imposed a separate 
license tax upon those merchants operating a distributing ..-:-
house for goods, wares and merchandise. The Court :first 
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disposed of the question of double taxation in the following 
language: 
"No question of double taxation is involved in this appeal, 
as it is well settled in this State that the provisions of Section 
168 of the Constitution, requiring equality and uniformity 
of taxation, apply only to a direct tax on property and not 
to license taxes which do not always rest upon a basis of 
uniformity. Bradley v. Richmond, 110 Va. 521, 66 S'. E. 872,. 
874; Pocahontas Consolidated Collieries Co., Inc., v. Com_.., 
monwealth, 113 Va. 108, 73 S. E. 446. '' · 
I 
It then took up the question of whether the classification 
was reasonable and approved the language of Judge Chiehes-
ter in McKen;ney v. City of .Alexandria, 147 Va. 147, as fol-
lows: 
''The general rule, so far as classification of business for 
the purpose of taxation is concerned, is that trades, occupa-
tions, professions and privileges may be classified for pur-
poses of license or occupation taxes, and different licenses 
may be imposed upon the various classes, provided the classi-
fication is reasonable. 37 C. J., page 198, section 52, and cases 
cited. Note 24, including a number of Virginia cases. General 
class·es may be subdivided into particular classes and licensed 
or taxed.'' 
Justice Campbell, delivering the opinion of the Court in 
Commonwealth v. Bibee, then proceeds as follows: 
"The discrimination between classes, in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of unconstitutionality, must rest upon some reason-
able ground of difference which has some relation to the 
business or occu.pation. The tax must bear equally and uni-
formly upon all persons engaged in the same class of busi-
ness. 
''It is the contention of def·endant tl1at the classification is 
unreasonable, for the reason that a special class of merchants 
is created and the effect of the statute is to impose an addi-
tional tax on an instrumentality of the business. With this 
contention we are unable to concur. ·It was competent for 
the legislature to place merchants operating a distributing 
house in a different classification from those merelv conduct-
ing retail stores. There is nothing in the record to., show that 
the maintenance of a distributing house is a necessary inci-
dent to the business of operating several retail stores. It is 
unquestionably true that the maintenanee and operation of 
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a large distributing house, in addition to operating seven 
retail stores imposes upon the Commonwealth and the cities 
thereof a greater burden in fulfilling their obligation· of 
protecting property dg·hts, maintaining stre·ets and highways, 
as well as furnishing sewer and other sanitary conveniences.'' 
The Court in this case likewise cited with approval Bradley 
v. Richmond, supra. 
I now take up discussion of the second question set out 
above, namely: 
(2) Is the City prohibited from classifying chain stores 
as such, because the Common,vealth has not adopted a similar 
classification Y 
The Court has decided the point at issue adversely to the 
plaintiff, on more than one occasion. See Norfolk v. Norfolk 
Landmark Co., 95 Va.. 564; Newport News Co. v. Newport .,./ 
News, 100 Va. 157 ;....N.a.dJJlk v. Grifjth Powell Co~ 102 Va. 
115 ; Bradley v. Rich1nond, 110 V a. 5 1. 
In these cases the Court sustained ordinances of the sev-
eral cities, imposing license taxes, respe:ctively, on newls-
papers, street railway companies, manufacturers and a cer-
tain class of private bankers, though no lieenses were at the · 
time required by the State. 
In Norfolk v. Norfolk Land·mark Co., 95 Va. 546, the Court 
said: 
. "When the legislature confers upon a municipality the 
general powers of taxation, it grants all of the po"rer pos-
sessed by itself in respect to the imposition of taxes; and 
the City can then impose taxes in its· discretion upon all sub-
jects within its jurisdiction, not withheld from taxation by 
the legislature, whether they be taxed by the State or not.'' 
See also City of Norfolk v. Griffith -Po~vell Co., 102 Va. 
115, where the above language is approved. 
In the latter case the Court further said, referring to 
the Legislature : . 
''If it confers the power of taxation upon a municipal cor-
poration, the power so delegated continues until it is recalled, 
and the mere failure of the legislature to exercise a part of 
its power cannot be construed as a.n impairment or diminution 
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of that ·which it had lawfully delegated to a subordinate agency 
of taxation, for the ideas of propriety, expediency and policy 
which influence all schemes of taxation may not be identical in 
the municipal councils and the legislature of the state. 
"We think it follows from what has been said, that an ordi-
nance which imposes a tax in a city clothed with full power of 
taxation stands on the sa.me footing with an act of the legis-
lature, and the courts, looking alone at the power to tax, will 
consider the ordinance without reference to the tax imposed 
by the legislature. If the legislature could have imposed the 
tax, but for reasons satisfactory to itself refrained from 
doing so, that will not invalidate the ordinance in the ab-
sence of the expressed or necessarily implied intention to 
withdraw the subject from taxation, or to require that it shall 
be taxed only in a particular mode.'' 
CONCLUSION. 
Attention is directed to Section 33, which gives the City 
power to require a license, whet~er one m8;y be requ~red by the 
State or not. Surely, under this power, 1f there be operated 
in the City a business not classified for license taxation, and 
not taxed by the State (as in this case), then the City is free, 
both to classify and tax this business, which it has done. 
Only by holding that Section 10 of the City ordinances, 
constitutes an attempt to divide into their constituent parts, 
merchants' licenses, as classified by the State (Section 188 of 
the Tax Code), can the court find fault with said ordinance. 
That' it does not attempt to do this is plain. 
It will be observed that there is no discrimination in Sec-
tion 10 of the ordinance. It applies alike to all persons, 
firms and corporations conducting more than one retail store 
in the City. As a matter of fact when the ordinance was 
adopted the operation of stores in excess of one, was not 
confined to chain store organizations, but quite a number 
of local citizens also operated such stores. The ordinance 
affected them just as it did the outside chain organizations. 
It is respectfully submitted that the ordinance meets every 
test laid down by this Court .and by the Supreme Court of 
the United States and should be declared a valid exercise of \ 
the municipal tax~ng power of the City. 
The City of Fredericksburg, Virginia, adopting this pe-
tition as its brief, prays that an appeal may be granted from 
the final action of the Corporation Court of Fredericksburg; 
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that this case may be reviewed and reversed and :final judg-
ment entered in' this Court for the City. 
A copy of this petition was delivered to F. M. Chichester, 
counsel of record for the Sanitary Grocery Company, Inc., 
on the 14th day of February, 1936. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA, 
By C. O'CONOR GOOLRICK, 
Its Attorney. 
I, C. 0 'Con or Goolrick, an . attorney practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of ;virginia, do hereby certify that 
in my opinion the judgment complained of in the foregoing 
petition should be reviewed and reversed by the said Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under my hand this 14th day of February, 1936. 
-
C. O'CONOR GOOLRICK. 
Received February 18, 1936. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
March 20, 1936. Writ of error awarded by the Court. No 
bond. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of Fredericks-
burg, Virginia. . 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 
30th day of October, 1934, the Sanitary Grocery Company, 
Inc., filed its application for correction of erroneous assess-. 
ment, which application is as follows : 
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In the Corpora.tio.n Court of Fredericksburg, Virginia. 
Sanitary Grocery Company, Inc., 
v. . 
The City of Fredericksburg, Virginia, a Municipal Corpora-
tion. 
APPLICATION FOR CORRECTION OF ERRONEOUS 
ASSESSMENT UNDER VIRGINIA TAX 
CODE, SECTION 414. 
To the Honorable Frederick W. Coleman, Judge of said Court: 
The applicant, Sanitary Grocery Company, Inc., a corpora-
tion duly chartered, organized and existing under and by 
virtue of the laws of Delaware, and duly licensed under the 
laws of the State of Virginia to engage in the State of Vir-
ginia in the business of operating a chain of retail grocery 
and meat stores, makes this application for relief ·from an 
erroneous assessment of a license tax levied on its chain stores 
in the ·City of Fredericksburg, Va., under an ordinance passed 
by the common council of the .said City of Fredericksburg 
in violation of the Constitution of the State of Virginia and 
the United States, the particulars of which will be more fully 
hereinafter set forth. 
Applicant alleges that the charter of the City of Fredericks-
burg, Va., was amended by an act approved, to-wit: March 29, 
1932, and pursuant thereto the common council of the City of 
Fredericksburg, Va., on, to-wit, December 13, 1932, and ap-
proved, to-wit, December 16, 1932, passed an ordi-
page 2 ~ nance of which Section 10 was a part, which reads 
as follows: 
''On every person, firm or corporation, opening, operating 
or maintaining two or more stores or mercantile establish-
ments in this City un·der the same general management, super-
vision or ownership, the following license fees: On two stores 
or more, $250.00 for each store in excess of one. 
The license fee herein prescribed shall be paid annually 
and shall. be in addition to the license prescribed by section 8 
and by any other section of this ordinanoo." 
Which section of the ordinance appli~nt aileges is uncon-
stitutional, illegal and void as violating the constitution of 
the State of Virginia and of the United States. 
· That pursuant to the said section 10 of the ordinanoo afore-
said, applicant was assessed for the years 1933 and 1934 a 
license tax in addition to the other taxes and licenses which 
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were assessed against it, $250.00 each for all stores operated 
by it i:n the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia, in ·excess of 
one. 
That applicant operates three stores located within the city 
limits of Fredericksburg, Va., and paid for the license year 
1933 the sum of $500.00 and for the license year 1.934 the sum 
of $500.00, making a total for the two years of $1,000.00 paid 
to the Collector of Revenue for the said City as required by 
the said city ordinance under section 10 of the same. 
That the assessments were made on the first day of January, 
1933, for the year 1933, and on the first day of January, 1934, 
for the year 1934; 
That the said payments were made under protest ; 
That the said assessment, under the ordinance, is 
page 3 ~ illegal and the said City was unauthorized by law 
to impose such lieense tax and that the levy and 
collection of the same was invalid for the reason, and it is 
therefore alleged, that the said section 10 of the said ordi-
nance under which the levy and collection was made, is un-
constitutional, illegal and void for the reasons: 
a. That it violates and exceeds the authority granted by 
Section 22 of Chapter 3 of the Charter of the City of Fred-
ericksburg, which reads as follo,vs: 
''Section 22. The Council shall have all the general powers 
vested in it by the Constitution and laws of the State, and 
it shall have power to enact ordinanc€s providing for the 
exercise within its jurisdiction of all police powers whic.h the 
State itself may exercise under the Constitution, except such 
as may be specially denied cities by the act of the general 
assembly, and shall further have power: 
''(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes, and to borrow money 
within the limits provided by the Constitution of ·virginia 
and by the statute laws of the Commonwealth.'' 
for the reason that the Statute law of the Commonwealth, as 
set forth in Section 188 of the Tax Code of Virginia, as ap-
proved March 23, 1932, clearly defines the methods and pur-
poses of taxation by the State anc1 municipalities of Virginia~ 
and the objects and things subject thereto, and which Act 
in no wise authorizes special license taxes on chain stores, 
and specifically requires that merehants shall be required to 
pa~ only the usual city, eounty, district and road or other 
leVIes. 
b. That sueh legislation by a 1nunicipality is not authorized 
by the General Assembly of the State of Virginia as sho~ 
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bv Section 168 of Article 13 of the Constitution of 
page 4 ~ the State of Virginia, which reads in part as follows : 
''All property ... 'vhether State·, local or rnunicipal, shall 
be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the terri-
torial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be 
levied and collected under general laws. The General Assem-
bly may define and classify taxable subjects, and,. except as 
to classes of property herein expressly segregated for either 
· State or local taxation, the Gene-ral Assembly may segregate 
the several classes of property so as to specify and determine 
upon what subjects State taxes, and upon what subjects local 
taxes ma.y be levied. '' 
c. The General Assembly of the State of Virginia, in grant-
ing the Charter to the City of Fredericksburg, again and 
again specifi~ly restated therein the fact that the grants 
to it were with the proviso that nothing therein granted should 
be in conflict with the Constitution or the· General Laws of 
the State of Virginia. · 
(a) That Section 10 of the Ordinance which was passed 
pursuant to Section 33 of the Charter of the City of Fred-
ericksburg is unconstitutional. The said Sec. 33 of the City 
Charter not being broad enough to admit of the classification 
under said Sec. 10 of the ordinance and is in conflict with 
Sec. 168 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the State of 
Va. heretofore set out. 
d. That S·eetion 10 of said ordinance penalizes chain stores 
with exorbitant license fees causing the discontinuance of ap-
plicant's business and the abrogation of leases with property 
owners, thus impairing the obligation of contracts in viola-
tion of section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the. United 
States and section 58 of Article ill of the Constitution of 
Virginia. 
e. That the said ordinance is null and void, it not being a 
proper exercise of police power and violates provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
f. That the said section 10 of the said ordinance . 
page 5 ~ is unconstitutional and void because it violates the 
heretofore mentioned section 168 of Article XIII of 
the Constitution of the S~ate of Virginia. 
g. That the said section is unreasonable and therefore void 
because contrary to the laws and the Constitution of the S'tate 
of Virginia, and is beyond the· power of the City Council to 
enact. 
h. That the said section 10 violates the p~ovisions of the 
16 · Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Ji,ourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
Stat·es in that it is an abridgement of the privileges and im-
munities guaranteed by the Amendment, the said section being 
partial, unreasonable, confiscatory, arbitrary, discriininatory 
and unequal, the classification being based upon no sound or 
reasonable basis. 
i. That the said section 10 of the said ordinance violates 
the provisions of paragraph 12 of section 63 of Article Ill 
of the Constitution of Virginia in that the City Council 
created by Act of the General Assembly of Virginia has un-
dertaken to do that which is specifically prohibited to its 
creator, that is to regulate trade by special or local law. 
That for the foregoing reasons applicant alleges that the 
levy and collection of the tax provided for by section 10 of 
the ordinance is illegal, unauthorized by law, and that the same 
is invalid and was erroneously charged against applicant and 
collected and that such erroneous assessment was not caus-ed 
by the willfur failure or refusal of the applicant to furnish 
tax assessing authority with the necessary information as 
required by law. · 
Applicant therefore prays that such assessment of $250.00 
on each of the stores operated by applicant in excess of one 
for the year 1933, beginning January 1, 1933, and 
page 6 ~ $250.00 on each of the two stores in excess of one for 
the year 1934, beginning J a.nuary 1, 1934, amount-
ing in the aggregate to $1,000.00, be corrected and declared 
erroneous, illegal and void and that the said amount of 
$1,000.00 as aforesaid be_ returned to applicant as provided 
by law; that said applicant be exonerated from the payment 
of further local levies hereafter; that notice of this applica-
tion be given to the Commonwealth's Attorney and City At-
torney for the City,. and the Commissioner of Revenue for 
the City; that the City of Fredericksburg be made a party 
defendant hereto and that the applicant may have such re-
lief as t'o the court in the premises may seem proper. 
SANITARY GROCERY COMPANY, INCOR-
PORATED, 
By A. COULTER "\VELLS & 
F. 1\L CHICHESTER, 
Attorneys. 
A. COULTER WELLS, 
F. M. CHICHESTER, 
Attorneys for Applicant. 
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Filed in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court Oct. 30, 
1934. 
page 7 ~ And on another date, to-wit, on the 9th day of 
November, 1935, the Court entered final order in 
this cause as follows·: 
Virginia: 
Corporation Court of Fredericksburg on the ninth day of 
November, 1935, present Honorable Frederick W. Coleman, 
Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. 
ORDER. 
Sanitary Grocery Company, Inc., 
v. 
City of Fredericksburg. 
THIS DAY came both plaintiff and defendant by their 
respective attorneys and the plaintiff having heretofore filed 
its application for a correction of erroneous assessment of 
license taxes for the years 1933 and 1934, and process there-
on having been duly issued and executed against the defend-
ant, whereupon the City of Fredericksburg moved the court 
to quash plaintiff's· application on the following grounds: 
(1) That the City ordinance, Section 10, complained of, is 
a valid and legal exercise of the power of taxation by the 
City. 
(2) That the City charter, Acts 1932, page 816, authorizes 
and empowers the Council of the City of Fredericksburg to 
levy the tax complained of. · 
( 3) The power to impose a tax on chain store concerns as 
a class, has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United . 
States. · . 
Indiooa v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 75 Law Ed. 284, 73 A. 
L. R. 1464. . 
A. ce P. Co. v. North Carolina, 284 U.S. 575. 
Fox, Tax Commissioner of West Virginia, v. 
page 8} Standard Oil Compa;wy of New Jersey. 
( 4) The classification made by the City ordinance is reason-
able and not arbitrary, considering the difference between an 
ordinary merchant and a chain store merchant. 
(5) The ordinance complained of neither violates the Con-
stitution of the United States nor the State of ;virginia and 
violates no statute law of the latter. 
18 .Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
( 6) The ordinance is not unreasonable nor is it confisca-
tory, arbitrary, discriminatory and unequal but on the con-
trary is reasonable both as to classification and the tax im-
posed. 
Which motion being argued by counsel for both parties, 
is', after consideration, overruled, to which action of the Court 
in overruling said motion, the defendant, the City of Fred-
ericksburg, duly excepted. 
Whereupon it is considered by the court that the defend-
ant, the City of Fredericksburg, do pay and refund unto the 
plaintiff, the Sanitary Grocery Company, Inc., the sum of 
$1,000.00, the amount illega.lly assessed by the said City of 
Fredericksburg under the ordinance for the years 1933 and 
1934. And the defendant by counsel, expressing a desire to 
apply to the Supreme Court of Virginia for a writ of error 
herefrom, execution on the aforesaid judgment is suspended 
for a period of sixty days from the date of this order, but be-
fore the said defendant shall have the benefit of this order, 
it, or someone for it, shall file before the Clerk of this Court, 
a. sus~nding bond in the sum of $500.00 without security 
conditioned as the la:w directs, on or before the first day of 
December, 1935. · . 
page 9 ~ Clerk's Offi·ce, Corporation Court of Fredericks-
burg, Va., on the 12th day of February, 1936. 
I, M. H. Willis, Clerk of the Corporation Court of Fred:-
ericksburg, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a. true copy 
of the entire record in the case for correction of erroneous 
assessment under Virginia. Tax Code, Section 414, pending 
in this Court, under the style of Sanitary Grocery Company, 
Inc., v. The City of Fredericksburg, Virginia. 
· I also certify that the notice, required by Section 6339 of 
the Code of Virginia was duly given to counsel of record for 
the plaintiff corporation, in the manner required thereby. 
Given under my hand this 12th day of February, 1936. 
1\L H. WILLIS, 
Clerk, Corporation Court of Fredericksburg, 
Virginia. 
Clerk's fee $2.50. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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